Research Seminar 02/06/21: Strategic Delegation to Organizations (by Petros Sekeris)
Ακαδημαϊκά Ερευνητικά Σεμινάρια στις Οικονομικές Επιστήμες, 2020-2021
Τμήμα Οικονομικών Επιστημών
Εθνικό και Καποδιστριακό Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών
Research Seminar Series in Economic Sciences, 2020-2021
Department of Economics
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Dear All,
We would like to inform you for the following research seminar:
Wednesday, June 2, 2021, 19:00-20:30
Petros Sekeris, Associate professor in Economics, Montpellier Business School.
URL: https://sites.google.com/view/petros-sekeris/home
Title: Strategic Delegation to Organizations (with D. Xefteris)
Webex link: https://uoa.webex.com/uoa/j.php?MTID=m19b37b7356e81ddecca8535e6eaf695a
Password (in case needed): i9vQMPUsb33
Abstract
In this paper we show that a principal can increase her payoffs by delegating decisions to an organization of agents {i.e. to a group of rational individuals who interact according to specified rules{ even when the agents' preferences are identical to those of the principal. The mechanism driving this result rests on the limited impact of individual choices on the _rm's policy, when more than one agents interact in shaping it. In strategic setups, delegating decisions to organizations of agents augments the set of equilibrium outcomes, allowing for Pareto improvements. Hence, our results provide a novel rationale for decentralized decision-making in _rms evolving in competitive environments.
JEL: D71, D72.
Keywords: delegation; organizations; decentralization; efficiency.
Organizers:
Professor Dimitris Kenourgios
Assoc. Professor George Dotsis
Assist. Professor Frago Kourandi
Department of Economics, NKUA.
http://www.econ.uoa.gr/ereynhtika-seminaria-research-seminars.html
Thank you